On Friday evening, 3 May, during a meeting of the negotiating council of the Constitutional Assembly, the NP delegation was difficult. I was sitting next to Ramaphosa, listening to the aggressive debate – it sounded as if parliament was in session and not like a negotiating council at all. After André Fourie, one of the hardliners, had stated his argument about labour matters, Ramaphosa whispered to me: ‘I can just see he is spoiling for a fight …’ I knew this was a fight Fourie couldn’t win; he didn’t have the armoury with which to do battle with the former trade unionist.

Roelf Meyer asked for an adjournment to calm the nerves. In the small NP caucus, I cautioned against Fourie’s tone and stated that his arguments were not on firm ground … there was a new political wind blowing and with his stubborn conduct he and his posse was playing into Ramaphosa’s hands. My words of caution were fat in the fire.

Meyer, forever the peacemaker, phoned FW there and at about 11 o’clock and asked for direction. FW was still in his office and invited everyone for a drink when the negotiating council concluded its business for the day. When we returned to the council, Meyer proposed that the proceedings be suspended so that we could get new mandates. The NP members immediately left for FW’s office … When FW welcomed me, he immediately put me on the spot: ‘I have been informed about the tension regarding some outstanding issues. Let’s try and resolve them.’ I was prepared for this discussion.

There was a concerted effort from the hardliners to undermine anything that pointed in the direction of a settlement with the ANC. They were upset because there was not a permanent power sharing model such as the Government of National Unity built into the Constitution. They had also hoped for a model with stronger devolution of power – federal elements – in the hands of the provinces.

I was calm but very determined when I started talking. I started by telling him what I had read recently in the history books – how the Afrikaner women had listened to the hoofs of the horses on the road when the Burghers returned and from it knew that the Burghers had lost the war. When I listened to my colleagues, they sounded like losers. Regardless of the outcome of these outstanding matters, I believed that we had achieved enough that I intended to vote for the Constitution on Wednesday 8 May. I didn’t even respond to the merits of the discussion regarding the right to strike and the lockout of workers by the employers.

I stated my case cautiously and very diplomatically – definitely not as an ultimatum. There was no debate regarding my comments. Shortly afterwards we adjourned. When I said goodbye, Meyer was standing next to FW and whispered, ‘I want to talk to you urgently; please wait for me.’

We were hungry and decided to have something to bite. Abré Hanekom from the NP support staff and professor Rassie Malherbe, technical advisor who also attended the late-night session with De Klerk, went with us to continue the discussion.

Meyer informed us that after the meeting he had spoken to De Klerk privately and had told him that he also wanted to vote for the Constitution on Wednesday 8 May, regardless of the further outcome of the sticky points. We had achieved enough and had everything to lose should we cast a negative vote. He didn’t want to cause an embarrassment for him in the meeting and had come to tell him that in private. FW looked stunned and surprised.

This was great news for me. I was no longer involved in a solo-flight. The adrenaline was rushing as we debated this matter. At 5 o’clock we ordered bacon and eggs.

Meyer asked Malherbe to draft a document in which we highlighted all the negotiating gains and from a process point of view what we stood to lose if we voted ‘no’ on Wednesday. This document had to reach De Klerk before Meyer and Ramaphosa joined De Klerk and Mandela for the final round of negotiations.

The eight-page Malherbe-document titled, ‘Why the National Party has to vote for the Constitution’ made it clear: we would lose all our hard-fought gains if we didn’t vote ‘yes’ for the Constitution. It would open the door for the ANC to unilaterally draft an alternative constitution where all the agreements reached with the NP would be ignored. They could change the articles regarding the two-thirds majority required to change sections of the constitution as well as the sections that required a 75% majority. They could change the minimum age of eighteen required for the right to vote, change the requirement for language – and culture rights as well as the provisions regarding property rights.

This document, together with other concessions made by the ANC, made it possible for FW to move the caucus to vote for the Constitution. A number of members on the NP benches found it difficult to hide their displeasure but they voted nonetheless. And they sat. They didn’t have the courage to organise a revolt or to protest and walk out. It didn’t preclude them from continuing with gossip campaigns. It also didn’t stop them from telling anyone who wanted to listen how little they thought of the Constitution.